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LEGISLATION
$493,468.62,6' and in 1954 the figure jumped to $747,346.00.61 The
cases processed in 1955 resulted in collections for dependents of
$1,198,937.76.62 Of this total, $592,194.34 63 was collected by courts
of other states as a result of actions initiated in New York.
Thus, there is no doubt as to the value of this interstate pro-
cedure. Its significance, however, lies not only in the fact that it has
brought relief to persons who would otherwise, for all practical pur-
poses, remain remediless; in a broader sense, its success has demon-
strated the value of reciprocal legislation. Such legislation in other
areas of the law will substantially prevent defendants from avoiding
liability by the simple expedient of crossing state lines.
PUNISHING PARENTS IN THE CHILDREN'S COURTS
Punishing parents of delinquent and neglected children is hardly
more civilized than burning witches, in the judgment of some writers.'
This school of thought has created a straw man, a fantastic image of
an opposite school-those who would punish for punishment's sake.
2
60 REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
189 (1954).
61 REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTE ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
281 (1955).
62 TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 30 (1955).
63 Ibid.
1 "'Parents need reassurance and strengthening, rather than criticism....
Our entire approach to parents should be one of interest and help, rather than
of blame.' (Quoted from a report of its Executive Director Herschel Alt for
the Child Guidance Institute of the Jewish Board of Guardians.)" Citrin v.
Belcastro, 196 Misc. 272, 282, 91 N.Y.S.2d 275, 285 (Child. Ct. 1949) (quoted
with approval). "'Parents of delinquent children need help, riot jails, fines or
threats and punishment.'" Id. at 287 (statement of Mr. Maximilian Moss, in
a public debate, January 11, 1949, quoted with approval).
2 "1 am weary of the old slogan in regard to juvenile delinquents: 'It is
really the parents who are to blame. They should be punished.' Are not these
unhappy parents already sufficiently punished? They have spent miserable years
with themselves and with each other." Irene Kawin (Deputy Chief Probation
Officer, Cook County, Chicago), Family Dissension as a Factor in Delinquency,
YEAR BOOK OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION ASSOCIATION 76 (1946), cited in Citrin
v. Belcastro. supra note 1 at 282, 91 N.Y.S.2d at 285. "'We, in the Children's
Bureau, have been much concerned about the way in which the idea that parents
of children who come into court must be punished appears to be gaining ground
throughout the country. Apparently no distinction is made between situations
in which parents by deliberate and overt acts have contributed to the delinquency
of their children and parents who have neglected to give their children guidance
by reason of their own handicaps and limitations, to say nothing of situations
in which the cause of misbehavior is beyond the control of parents, as, for
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Actually, the true opposing thesis is that the children's courts, by a
proper use of orders enforcible in contempt, can and should bring the
parents of delinquent and neglected children to recognize and execute
their duty to protect, instruct and control their children.3 The sup-
porters of this thesis are as anxious as the "no punishment" advocates
to shunt from the children's courts to the criminal courts the task of
vindicating the penal law against adult offenders. The assumption
and exercise by the children's courts of a criminal jurisdiction over
adult misdemeanants ill befits the civil character of these courts. Fur-
thermore, it has obscured the propriety and necessity of exercising in
the children's courts the remedial proceeding of ordering parental
conduct under the sanction of contempt.4
Some published information raises the question, to what extent
are our children's court judges influenced by the "no punishment"
propaganda. Statistics published in the latest report of the Domestic
Relations Court clearly indicate that the judges of the Children's Court
of New York City have, in recent years, deemed adult proceedings
expedient in an amazingly small number of cases. In the period 1941
to 1949, the per annum ratio was 64 adult proceedings for every 1,000
children's cases; while in the period 1950 to 1955, the proportion
dropped dramatically to less than 3 adult proceedings per 1,000
children's cases.5 In so far as these figures may represent a shifting
of criminal prosecutions of adults from children's courts to the crim-
inal courts, they should occasion congratulation. But to the degree
that they may reflect an abdication of the children's courts' respon-
sibility to correct delinquent parents, they should cause serious con-
cern. Nor is this concern without basis in the published figures.
The report cited indicates that during the years 1954 and 1955,
in the cases of delinquent or neglected children disposed of after in-
vestigation by the court's Probation Bureau, approximately 75 per cent
of the children were returned to the homes from which they had come.6
example, cases of mental illness. . . .' (Quoted from an April 8, 1947 letter
of Dr. Katherine F. Lenroot, Chief of the United States Children's Bureau,
Washington, D.C.)." Citrin v. Belcastro, sapra note 1 at 281-82, 91 N.Y.S.2d
at 284-85.
3 LUDWIG, YOUTH AND THE LAW 146-52 (1955).
4 In the reported cases, we find only one directly relating to the contempt
jurisdiction of children's courts and decided after People v. Rogers, 248 App.
Div. 141, 288 N.Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dep't), affd mem., 272 N.Y. 612, 5 N.E.2d
357 (1936). Contempt proceedings in Children's Court are civil in nature and
the New York Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply. People ex rel.
Quigley v. Marsden, 188 Misc. 37, 66 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (by
implication).
5 TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DOMESTIc RELATIoNs COURT OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 2, Part II (1955). In the period from 1941 to 1949,
the court's average annual incidence of new cases concerning neglected or de-
linquent children was 7,791; in the same period the average annual occurrence
of adult proceedings was 503. In the period 1950 to 1955, the annual averages
were: children's cases 9,094; adult proceedings 26. Ibid.
6 The Report cited in the preceding note, at page 17 of Part II, indicates
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The statistics fail to indicate whether or not the persons having cus-
tody were placed under court orders with respect to their care and
supervision of the children. Nor are figures given as to proceedings
against adults for violation of such orders. 7
Control Through Contempt
It seems self-evident that persons who have custody exert at least
some control over the circumstances which affect a child's conduct
and welfare. If a neglected or delinquent child is to be returned to
his home, the court must require that those who have day to day
control of the child's life shall assume responsibility toward the child.
Care and control of the child's welfare and conduct is exercised by the
parents, or it is effectively exercised by no one. If their cooperation
cannot be enlisted, it would seem that the court's duty to protect and
correct children would require commitment of all, or nearly all, such
children; otherwise the remedial process would be limited to the short
time that a child is in court or in conference with a probation officer.
Parents of such children can be enlisted as agents of the court's cor-
rective and protective effort only if the responsibility is imposed upon
them by the court, and that duty cannot be imposed with effect unless
it is enforcible by sanction.
The extreme opponents of punishment for parents conceive of
the court as a welfare agency only.8 They ignore the fact that, al-
though the children's courts may advantageously offer advice and
encouragement and make available health and welfare services, the
courts remain essentially judicial agencies, with the distinctive power
and duty to determine and enforce rights and responsibilities of citi-
zens toward each other and toward the state. The courts are endowed
with the authority of the state to make and enforce their determina-
tions. If children's courts are not to have and exercise the power to
punish for contempt, they would do better to give way to some agency
which will offer counsel only, and let the courts of general jurisdiction
reassume the judicial functions delegated to the children's courts.
that in 1954 the Probation Bureau of the Children's Division of the court dis-
posed of a total of 7,933 children's delinquency and neglect cases, after inves-
tigation; in 1955 the total was 7,670. No other years are represented in the
Table. In 1954, 1,743 children were committed to institutions, 4,291 were placed
on probation or supervision, and in 1,899 cases, the children were discharged or
sentence was suspended. In 1955 the totals so disposed of were 1,401, 4,280 and
1,989, respectively. Thus, about 759o of the children were returned to their
homes; 507o under probation or supervision; 25%o without court supervision.
No data is given regarding orders made to persons having custody of children.
7 The only pertinent figures appearing in the Report are those on "New
Adult Proceedings"; in 1954 there were 12, and in 1955, 21. TWENTY-THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DoMEsTic RELATIONS COURT OF TIRE CITY OF Nzw
YORK 2, Part II (1955).8 See notes 1 and 2 supra.
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That children's courts have power to punish for contempt is clear,
but for many years children's courts in this state have gone further
and assumed to exercise criminal jurisdiction of adult offenses which
are related to juvenile delinquency or neglect. In this they have been
upheld by a number of appellate decisions. Yet there is reason to
believe that the cases wherein that jurisdiction was upheld were not
correctly decided. However that may be, the propriety and necessity
of punishing parents in the children's courts cannot be properly eval-
uated without examining the doctrine so long asserted, that those
courts have a criminal jurisdiction of adult offenders against children.
Existing Statutes
The 1921 amendment of Article VI, Section 18, of the New York
State Constitution 9 authorized the legislature to establish courts of
domestic relations and children's courts. Accordingly, in 1922, chil-
dren's courts were established in counties outside the City of New
York by the Children's Court Act of the State of New York.10
Another act, in 1924, established the Children's Court of the City of
New York." Subsequently, both the Family Court 12 and the New
York City Children's Court were made divisions of the New York
City Domestic Relations Court.
13
The children's courts of this state are thus governed by two dis-
tinct acts; the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York
applies in the five counties comprising the City of New York, and the
Children's Court Act of the State of New York has application in the
other counties of the state except Chautauqua County. For the sake
of clarity and brevity, these acts will be referred to as the "City Act"
and the "Upstate Act," respectively. The two acts describe the courts'
jurisdiction over adults in provisions which are generally, though not
in every respect, parallel. The "Upstate Act" declares that the
Children's Court has jurisdiction to:
* . . determine all cases less than the grade of felony which may arise against
any parent or other adult responsible for . . . the delinquency of or neglects
any child. 14
This provision is echoed by the "City Act." 15 In provisions apart
from the foregoing, the acts further provide that:
9 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 18.
10 Laws of N.Y. 1922, c. 547, amended in its entirety by Laws of N.Y. 1930,
c. 393.
"1 Laws of N.Y. 1924, c. 254.
12 Formerly constituted under N.Y.C. CRIM. CTS. ACT § 105 (later repealed
as § 74 by Laws of N.Y. 1933, c. 482, § 164).
13 Laws of N.Y. 1933, c. 482.
14 N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. Acr § 6(4).
15 N.Y.C. Dom. REL. CT. ACT § 61(2). For the text of this section, see
note 48, infra.
[ VOL. 30
LEGISLATION
Any violation of any order made pursuant to the provisions of this section
shall be punishable as a misdemeanor . but the court may, in its discretion,
proceed with and adjudicate upon it as a contempt of court....j6
To distinguish between a violation of an order of the children's court
and the offense of contributing to the delinquency or neglect of a child,
the former will be denominated "violations," the latter "contributing
offenses."
Decisions in the Higher Courts
Children's Court a Civil Forum
That the children's court, in punishing "violations," can exercise
no criminal jurisdiction is well established. This proposition was
clearly stated by the Appellate Division in the case of People v.
Rogers,'7 which was subsequently affirmed without opinion by the
Court of Appeals. There, the defendant, having violated an order of
a children's court which directed him to pay for the maintenance of
his children,' 8 was convicted in Special Sessions of the crime of having
unlawfully omitted to provide for a child. He appealed his conviction,
contending that because the "violations" clause of the "City Act" gave
the Children's Court exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations
of its own orders, Special Sessions was without power to try him.
The court rejected this contention upon two grounds. Special Ses-
sions Court was held to have exclusive jurisdiction to try misde-
meanors within the City of New York.' 9 Secondly, although the
Children's Court has exclusive power to punish the "violation" as a
contempt,20 this power is not in derogation of the Special Sessions
jurisdiction of misdemeanors; the Children's Court has no power to
try the misdemeanor charge as such. This second ground was estab-
lished by construing the "violations" provision of the "City Act" in
the light of a prior Court of Appeals holding that proceedings in
Domestic Relations Court are civil in nature.21 To further support
its construction, the Appellate Division referred to the failure of the
act to provide procedural machinery adapted to a criminal prosecution.
16 N.Y. CHiLDEN's CT. Act § 6(3) (c) ; N.Y.C. Dom. REL. Cr. AcT § 61(4).
17 248 App. Div. 141, 288 N.Y. Supp 900 (1st Dep't), aff'd mere., 272 N.Y.
612, 5 N.E.2d 357 (1936).
18 The children had been committed to an institution by the court. At that
time, Children's Court in the City of New York had jurisdiction to order support
in such a case, under former Section 61(3) of the N.Y.C. Dom. REL. CT. Act
(later repealed by Laws of N.Y. 1940, c. 671, § 4). The jurisdiction was trans-
ferred to Family Court Division. Laws of N.Y. 1940, c. 671, § 2.
9 N.Y.C. CRIm. CTs. AcT § 31(1).20N.Y.C. Dom. REL. CT. Act §61(4); cf. N.Y. CHILDREN'S Cr. Act
§ 6 (2) (c).
21 Kane v. Necci, 269 N.Y. 13, 198 N.E. 613 (1935).
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Criminal Jurisdiction and the Children's Courts
Eleven years later, with only one justice remaining of those who
had unanimously decided the Rogers case, the same Department con-
strued the provisions of the "City Act" which govern "contributing
offenses." In Humann v. Rivera,22 the court held that the Children's
Court had jurisdiction to convict a mother on the criminal charge of
contributing to her son's delinquency. She had served part of a jail
sentence, imposed by the Children's Court after her conviction in a
proceeding where a volume of hearsay had been admitted against her
and where she had not understood the charges preferred. On the
rationale that a criminal proceeding entitles her to application of the
rules of criminal law regarding the quality of evidence and under-
standing of the charges, judgment was reversed and a new trial
ordered, "assuming the proper authorities deem it necessary." 2 But
the motion to vacate judgment was denied, because, it was stated, the
"contributing offenses" provision of the "City Act" gives to the Chil-
dren's Court criminal jurisdiction in such a case. The holding in the
Rogers case was distinguished as applying only to the "violations"
provision of the act. On the issue of whether the act provides ade-
quate procedural machinery for trial of criminal cases in Children's
Court, it was held, contrary to the doctrine expounded in the Rogers
case upon this point, that Section 75 of the "City Act" 24 properly
incorporates, for trial of such cases, the procedure of the criminal
courts. The decision relied upon the text of the "contributing
offenses" provision of the "City Act," and upon the decisions of
the other Departments which broadly construed the "contributing
offenses" provisions of the "Upstate Act." 25 No attention was given
to the doctrine that children's and family courts are civil fora, and
their proceedings civil in nature.
Proceedings Characterized by the Nature of the Forum
While no decision of the Court of Appeals has directly construed
either the "contributing offenses" or the "violations" provision of the
acts governing the children's courts, a line of decisions in that court
has established the principles that a proceeding takes on the nature
of the forum in which it is tried, and that domestic relations courts
generally, and children's courts in particular, are civil fora. These
principles formed one of the bases of the Rogers decision. Kane v.
22272 App. Div. 352, 71 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1st Dep't 1947).
23 Humann v. Rivera, 272 App. Div. 352, 357, 71 N.Y.S.2d 321, 326 (1st
Dep't 1947).
24 N.Y.C. Dom. Rm- CT. AcT § 75; cf. N.Y. CHILDMN'S CT. AcT § 14. See
text at note 37, infra.
25 The Appellate Division decisions construing the "contributing offenses"
provision of the "Upstate Act" are discussed below. See notes 46, 51 infra.
[ VOL. 30
LEGISLATION
Necci,26 relied upon in the Rogers case, was an appeal from an order
of the Appellate Division 27 reversing a Family Court order for sup-
port of the defendant's stepchildren. The Court of Appeals held that
an appeal from a final order of the Appellate Division in a case which
had originated in Domestic Relations Court must comply with the
requirements of the Civil Practice Act.28  It could not, as was con-
tended, come to the Court of Appeals under the Code of Criminal
Procedure provisions.29 For, the court reasoned, support proceedings
are civil proceedings because they have been shifted to the civil side
of the courts, being taken from the criminal jurisdiction of Special
Sessions and given to Domestic Relations Court, "proceedings in
which are treated as of a civil rather than of a criminal nature." 30
The court, in referring to Section 102 of the "City Act," which em-
powers Family Court to impose imprisonment up to twelve months
for failure to provide support,31 declared that this power to punish
does not make the proceeding a criminal one. The same principles
were approved in Matter of Clausi, 2 which was a paternity proceed-
ing originating in an upstate Children's Court. A divided Appellate
Division had affirmed 3 3 an order of filiation, and the defendant ap-
pealed, without leave, to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dis-
missed as it does not lie as of right, even in criminal cases. But the
court corrected the view entertained by both parties that this was a
26269 N.Y. 13, 198 N.E. 613 (1935).2 7 Kane v. Necci, 245 App. Div. 1, 280 N.Y. Supp. 489 (2d Dep't 1935).2 8 When the decision was made, Section 58 of the New York City Domestic
Relations Court Act expressly incorporated Articles 37 and 39 of the New York
Civil Practice Act, but omitted reference to Article 38 which governs appeals
from the Appellate Division to the Court of Appeals. Section 43 of the New
York Children's Court Act did not provide for appeals to the Court of Appeals.
Both sections, as amended in 1954, now expressly provide, "Appeals to the court
of appeals shall be governed by the provisions of the civil practice act relating
to appeals to that court in civil cases. .. ." Laws of N.Y. 1954, c. 806, §§ 15, 16.29 N.Y. CoDE CRIm. PROc. § 520(3).
30 Kane v. Necci, 269 N.Y. 13, 15, 198 N.E. 613, 614 (1935).
31 The section cited has been part of the "City Act" since that act became
law in 1933. Laws of N.Y. 1933, c. 482. Support jurisdiction was given to
the upstate children's courts only in 1942. Laws of N.Y. 1942, c. 810. Those
courts also have power to imprison a person guilty of non-support for a maxi-
mum term of six months. N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. Acr § 31-a. Although the
language of Section 31-a is closely similar to Section 102 of the "City Act"
which, it was held by the Court of Appeals in Kane v. Necci, has not the effect
of making a support proceeding in family court a criminal proceeding, yet the
Supreme Court has held that a proceeding under Section 31-a of the "Upstate
Act" is a criminal proceeding. The county whose children's court had com-
mitted persons to a state mental hospital in such proceedings was held liable
for their charges, Section 79 of the Mental Hygiene Law making the county
chargeable where commitments were made "upon a court order arising out of
a criminal action." Application of Eaton, 196 Misc. 648, 92 N.Y.S.2d 461
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
32296 N.Y. 354, 73 N.E.2d 548 (1947).
33 Matter of Clausi, 271 App. Div. 845, 66 N.Y.S.2d 347 (3d Dep't 1946)
(per curiam).
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criminal appeal; it was declared to be an appeal in a civil proceeding
because it was tried in a children's court. By the same token, a
filiation proceeding brought in Special Sessions, as must still be done
in the City of New York,3 4 would be a criminal proceeding. 5  Ac-
cordingly, where filiation matters have been shifted, by Domestic
Relations Law Section 122(3) and the "Upstate Act" Section 6(3) 36
from the criminal courts to the jurisdiction of the children's courts,
the proceeding becomes civil and non-criminal. Thus, if the Rivera
decision is correct in its holding that Children's Court has, by the act
which created it, a criminal jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has been
wrong in insisting upon the civil character of proceedings in that court
as a necessary corollary to the civil nature of the court, and never once
adverting to or distinguishing the court's possession of an innate crim-
inal jurisdiction.
The Rivera Decision Reviewed
Humann v. Rivera, in resolving one issue, relied upon Section 75
of the "City Act" as incorporating procedure for trial of "contributory
offenses" in children's courts. The section provides that:
Where the method of procedure in a case . . . in which the court has
jurisdiction is not prescribed by this act, such procedure shall be the same ...
[as that of] other courts exercising like jurisdiction. . .. 37
However, Section 75, and its parallel procedure section in the "Upstate
Act," 38 could not, if taken by themselves, be construed to incorporate
criminal procedure. To construe them thus, it would be necessary
independently to establish the premise that the children's courts have
criminal jurisdiction. Only then can the procedure sections, by the
clause which limits their scope to a case or proceeding in which the
court has jurisdiction, be held to incorporate criminal procedure.
To construe the "contributing offenses" provisions of the "City
Act" as giving to the Children's Court criminal jurisdiction of adult
misdemeanors is to assert, in effect, that the provision repeals,
pro tanto, the grant to Special Sessions of exclusive jurisdiction of
misdemeanors which is explicitly contained in the Criminal Courts
Act.39 In the Rogers case, however, this same consideration led the
court to conclude that the "violations" provision did not give the
Children's Court jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor charge as such.
In another important respect criminal procedure cannot be in-
corporated into the children's court acts. Both provide only for pro-
3 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 122(3); N.Y.C. CRI . CTs. Acr § 31(3).
35 See Matter of Clausi, 296 N.Y. 354, 73 N.E.2d 548 (1947), which relied
on Hodson v. Hoff, 291 N.Y. 518, 50 N.E.2d 648 (1943).
36 The upstate children's courts received filiation jurisdiction in the act which
created them. Laws of N.Y. 1922, c. 547.
37 N.Y.C. DoM. REL. CT. Acr § 75.
38 N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 14.
39 N.Y.C. CRIM. CTs. AcT § 31(1).
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ceedings before a single judge.40  In the "Upstate Act," the court has
discretion to employ a jury.41 Yet in the criminal courts most offenses
against children are, as a matter of right, triable before a plural
tribunal. In the City of New York, as was pointed out in the Rogers
decision, Special Sessions has jurisdiction to try misdemeanors, 42 and
a defendant in such case has the right to trial before three judges of
that court.43  In the upstate jurisdictions, inferior criminal courts can
try a charge of cruelty to children 44 before a single judge. But the
more serious charges in the area of "contributing offenses" are triable,
as of right, upon indictment, and in the County Court before a jury.45
In the way of precedents, four upstate decisions of the Appellate
Division 46 were relied upon in the Rivera case. These decisions are
the authority invoked for the propositions that in trying "contributing
offenses" children's courts exercise criminal jurisdiction, and that such
trials are subject to the safeguards of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In none of the decisions are these conclusions made explicit, nor is
there any offer of reasoned justification for them.47
40 N.Y.C. Dom. R.L. CT. AcT § 83; cf. N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 4.
41 N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. Act § 14.
42 N.Y.C. CPim. CTs. AcT §§31(1), 130(j).
43 Id. § 131.
44 N.Y. CODE Calm. PRoc. § 56(27).
45 The jurisdiction of Special Sessions in the upstate counties does not
extend to the misdemeanor of impairing the morals of a minor described in
Section 483 of the New York Penal Law. Cf. People v. Baxter, 196 App.
Div. 824, 188 N.Y. Supp. 181 (3d Dep't 1921). Nor does the jurisdiction of
those courts extend to the other serious offenses against children. People v.
Kramer, 191 Misc. 426, 74 N.Y.S.2d 715 (County Ct. 1947). These more
serious misdemeanors are triable in County Court N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.§ 39. The defendant there has a right of trial before a jury. Id. § 355.
46 People v. Richard, 271 App. Div. 1047, 69 N.Y.S.2d 794 (4th Dep't 1947)(mem. opinion); People v. Smith, 266 App. Div. 57, 41 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d
Dep't 1943); People v. Dritz, 259 App. Div. 210, 18 N.Y.S.2d 455 (2d Dep't
1940) (mem. opinion); People v. Kelley, 230 App. Div. 249, 243 N.Y. Supp.
613 (3d Dep't 1930) (per curiam). Smith was charged with endangering the
morals of a girl sixteen years of age. His conviction was reversed on two
grounds; that the children's court which convicted him had no jurisdiction of
the adult offense where the child had not been adjudged delinquent, and that the
information was defective as stating only a belief that the defendant had done
the acts charged. The other defendants were also charged with contributing
to juvenile delinquency. Richard was accused of indecent conduct in reference
to a girl aged fourteen; Dritz, of helping a child thief dispose of stolen prop-
erty; Kelley, of giving refuge in a speakeasy to an escaped delinquent girl.
Richard's conviction was reversed because he had not had a jury trial. The
conviction of Dritz was upheld against the contention that children's court had
not jurisdiction of the adult offense where adjudication of the child's delinquency
was had after the adult proceeding had commenced but before the offender was
convicted. The information against Kelley was permitted to stand in children's
court, though an indictment on the same charge had been presented in County
Court; the prohibition of double jeopardy was held inapplicable to such pre-
liminaries as indictments and informations.
47 Two earlier upstate Appellate Division decisions, not cited in the Rivera
case, assumed the existence in children's courts of criminal jurisdiction over
1956]
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The judges who determined the Rivera appeal found support for
their position in the section of the "City Act" providing for the "con-
tributing offenses" jurisdiction of the Children's Court. Read by
itself, the text of the section 48 supports the construction that criminal
jurisdiction is here conferred upon the Children's Court. Although a
construction which views the section as granting only the power to
hold the offending adult in contempt may seem improper, such a con-
struction is not without warrant. The statute is in derogation of the
common law; the Children's Court is one of limited jurisdiction and
of statutory origin; and the broader construction of the statute in the
Rivera case limits the rights of one who is accused of crime. Any
statute which can be classified in one of these categories must be
strictly construed. 49 The fact that the Court of Appeals has held these
courts and the proceedings therein to be essentially civil 10 is further
reason to construe this provision strictly. But in view of the holdings
of the Appellate Division on the criminal jurisdiction exercised under
the "contributing offense" provisions,51 and of the similar course taken
in the children's courts' decisions discussed below, it seems that the
broader construction of the statute is not likely to be disturbed.
Children's Court Decisions Not Appealed
There are fifteen reported cases in which children's courts have
tried adults on "contributing offense" charges. Of these opinions, two
were written by Judge Smyth of Westchester County, eleven by Jus-
tice Panken and two by Justice Sicher.
Justice Sicher, in a 1947 case,52 held that the Children's Court
had no jurisdiction of the misdemeanor prosecution of an adult who
allegedly contributed to a child's delinquency. The determination
adult offenses. See People v. De Pue, 217 App. Div. 321, 217 N.Y. Supp. 205
(3d Dep't 1926); People v. Hopkins, 208 App. Div. 438, 203 N.Y. Supp. 653
(3d Dep't 1924), appeal dimnissed, 239 N.Y. 589, 147 N.E. 207 (1925).
48 "The children's court shall have jurisdiction, whenever the issues involving
a delinquent or neglected child are before the court summarily to try, hear and
determine any charge or offense, less than the grade of a felony, against any
parent, or other person in loco parentis to such child, involving an act or omis-
sion in respect to such child. . . ." N.Y.C. Dome. REL. CT. Acr § 61(2). For
the text of the corresponding section in the "Upstate Act," see text at note 14
supra.
49 People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 195 N.Y. 190, 197, 88 N.E. 38, 40 (1909)
(dictum).
50 See Matter of Clausi, 296 N.Y. 354, 73 N.E.2d 548 (1947) ; Kane v. Necci,
269 N.Y. 13, 198 N.E. 613 (1935).
51 Humann v. Rivera, 272 App. Div. 352, 71 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1st Dep't 1947);
People v. Richard, 271 App. Div. 1047, 69 N.Y.S.2d 794 (4th Dep't 1947)(mem. opinion); People v. Smith, 266 App. Div. 57, 41 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dep't
1943); People v. Dritz, 259 App. Div. 210, 18 N.Y.S.2d 455 (2d Dep't 1940)
(mem. opinion); People v. Kelley, 230 App. Div. 249, 243 N.Y. Supp. 613 (3d
Dep't 1930) (per curiam). See note 46 mspra.
52 Bowman v. Cruz, 188 Misc. 826, 68 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Child. Ct. 1947) (The
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rested upon the authority of the Rogers case, and upon a very well
reasoned criticism of the view that the "contributing offense" provi-
sions give criminal jurisdiction to children's courts. Soon thereafter,
the Appellate Division determined the Rivera appeal. Subsequently,
in deciding Citrin v. Belcastro 53 Justice Sicher did not hold that the
Children's Court lacked criminal jurisdiction in a "contributing
offense" prosecution, though the question was squarely before him.
In the years 1936 to 1951, Justice Panken wrote eleven opinions
in proceedings where adults were tried under the "contributing
offense" provisions of the "City Act." Two parents and a grand-
parent were convicted of offenses contributing to neglect.54 Five
parents were convicted of offenses relating to the delinquency of their
children.5  Two adults were found guilty of contributing to the de-
linquency of children not in their custody,56 and one adult so charged
was found not guilty.5 7 Judge Smyth convicted the defendants in two
cases where criminal charges were made."8 In another case, he made
defendant was charged with having sold to the delinquent child cartridges which
he used to wound another child. Sale of the ammunition to the child violated
the Penal Law.).
53 196 Misc. 272, 91 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Child. Ct. 1949) (The charge was that
the defendant, "boyfriend" of the child's mother, had punished the child so
severely as to contribute to his neglect. It was held that one who was the
parent's agent in administering punishment, but who was not himself in loco
parentis, could not be charged under the "contributing offenses" provision.).
5, People v. Phipps, 97 N.Y.S2d 845 (Child. Ct. 1950) (A father not in
custody quizzed his six year old child on the sordid details of her mother's
associations with other men.); In re O'Donnell, 61 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Child. Ct.
1946) (The defendant grandmother, off on a carousal, had left her own young
children with those of her daughter unattended in a flat where two of the chil-
dren perished in a fire.); In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Child. Ct. 1944)
(semble) (The mother had refused to have her child vaccinated, so that he was
not admitted to school and was found delinquent as a truant.).
55 Matter of "Tana," 197 Misc. 67, 93 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Child. Ct. 1949)
(setble) (The father helped his 14 year old daughter to misrepresent her age
and so get a marriage license without leave of court.); O'Rourke v. Reeve,
93 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Child. Ct. 1949) (The father was accused of drinking the
proceeds of the family relief check.) ; Seleina v. Seleina, 93 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Child.
Ct. 1949) (The father, separated from his wife and child, encouraged the child
in disobeying its mother.); In re DiMaggio, 65 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Child. Ct. 1946)
(semble) (The father negligently left his gun where the son could find it and
use it to wound another child seriously.) ; People v. Denny, 50 N.Y.S.2d 435
(Child. Ct. 1944) (The father received goods stolen by his child.).
586 People v. Jones, 199 Misc. 926, 102 N.Y.S2d 629 (Child. Ct. 1951) (A
group of delinquent children used the defendant's home as a hangout and she
bought from them bed linen they had stolen from a neighbor's clotheslines.) ;
Zambrotto v. Jannette, 160 Misc. 558, 290 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Child. Ct. 1936)
(where defendant apparently received goods stolen by a child).
57 The nature of the specific offense does not appear, and the report does not
indicate whether the man was parent or stranger to the child involved. In re
Rosen, 54 N.Y.S2d 632 (Child. Ct. 1945).5 8 Matter of "Jones," 198 Misc. 269, 98 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Child. Ct. 1950) (A
woman's immoral conduct with several men, by which her children were con-
ceived, was held to constitute wilful acts by which she contributed to the chil-
dren's neglect.); Matter of Weise, 193 Misc. 672, 84 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Child. Ct.
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an order for support under the "violations" provision of the "Upstate
Act," and held that to be a civil proceeding distinct from the criminal
proceedings which he said were authorized under the "contributing
offenses" jurisdiction. 59
In his opinions, 60 Judge Smyth clearly asserts that children's
courts have jurisdiction, by virtue of the "contributing offenses" pro-
vision of the "Upstate Act," to try adults for the crime of contributing
to neglect, described in Section 494 of the Penal Law."1 From the
language of his opinions, it is clear that Justice Panken, like Judge
Smyth, conceived the direct purpose of the jurisdiction exercised in
"contributing offense" cases to be the punishment of adult criminals.6 2
He describes himself as a magistrate of a criminal court 3 and he
shows zeal for observance of the rules of criminal prosecution.6
Yet in passing sentence, neither judge seems to have been anxious
to punish for the sake of punishing. In Judge Smyth's two "criminal"
cases, the persons convicted were given suspended sentences and
placed on probation, with orders regulating their conduct so as to
prevent future neglect. 65 Apparently Justice Panken followed the
same practice in many cases; it is mentioned in two only,66 but its use
in other cases may be inferred from the decisions which make no men-
1948) (The court held that, where it had before it evidence that the defendant's
children were neglected, formal adjudication of their neglect was not necessary
before convicting the father of contributing to their neglect).
59 La Rocca v. La Rocca, 144 Misc. 737, 259 N.Y. Supp. 569 (Child. Ct.
1922).60 See notes 58 and 59 supra.
61 "A ... person having custody of a child... who omits to exercise rea-
sonable diligence . . . to prevent such child from becoming guilty of juvenile
delinquency . . . or from becoming adjudged by a children's court in need of
the care and protection of the state ... or who permits such a child to asso-
ciate with vicious, immoral or criminal persons, or to grow up in idleness, or
to beg or solicit alms, or to wander about the streets of any city, town or
village late at night ... or to furnish entertainment for gain ... in any public
place, or to be an habitual truant from school, or to habitually wander around
any railroad yard or tracks, to enter any house of prostitution or assignation,
or any place where gambling is carried on .... or to enter any place where
the morals of such child may be endangered or depraved or may be likely to
be impaired .. . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PEN. LAW § 494.
62 See, e.g., Zambrotto v. Jannette, 160 Misc. 558, 290 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Child.
Ct. 1936), where the Justice distinguished the holding in the Rogers case, assert-
ing that although children's court was held to be a civil court, the holding had
not been that the legislature could not confer a criminal jurisdiction upon that
court.
63 O'Rourke v. Reeve, 93 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Child. Ct. 1949) ; Seleina v. Seleina,
93 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Child. Ct. 1949); People v. Denny, 50 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Child.
Ct. 1944).64 See People v. Phipps, 97 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Child. Ct. 1950) ; In re Whitmore,
47 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Child. Ct. 1944).
65 Matter of 'Jones," 198 Misc. 269, 98 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Child. Ct. 1950);
see Matter of Weise, 193 Misc. 672, 84 NY.S.2d 725 (Child. Ct. 1948).
66 People v. Jones, 199 Misc. 926, 102 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Child. Ct. 1951);
Seleina v. Seleina, mepra note 63.
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tion of imposition of sentence. 7 He did, however, commit to jail
three convicted misdemeanants, 68 and fined another $50.69
The practice of convicting the adult upon a criminal charge, but
suspending sentence and placing him on probation, is hardly different,
in giving the court effective control of his future conduct, from the
civil procedure of making an order to the adult which will be enforcible
by contempt proceedings. But the incidental effects of the former
device may be unfair to the adult and may impoverish the ability of
the court to enlist his genuine cooperation. The adult's conviction in
children's court, while denying him at least some of the procedural
protections of the criminal law, labels him a criminal. If an adult be
convicted by a single judge in children's court, and the certificate of
conviction is filed with the County Clerk describing the offense as a
Penal Law misdemeanor,70 that certificate may become the basis, in
another criminal prosecution, for convicting the adult as an habitual
criminal.71 Where the children's court proceeds criminally, the puni-
tive nature of the court's approach to him is likely to make the adult
resent both the court and the child. On the other hand, the forward-
looking character of the order enforcible through contempt proceedings
gives the adult a fresh and fair start in meeting his responsibilities,
while it gives the court a firm control over his conduct.
Proposed Changes in Children's Court Procedure
Under the present statutes, only the Children's Court of the City
of New York is required to summon the child's custodian when a
petition alleging neglect has been filed.7 2  If, however, the petition
filed alleges delinquency, the court may proceed without hearing the
person in charge of the child.7 3 The "Upstate Act" does not require
the parents or those in loco parentis to be summoned, whether the
proceedings are in delinquency or in neglect.74  In relation to the
power of the court to make orders, the "contributing offense" provi-
sion of the "City Act" gives the court power, in its discretion, to im-
pose by order, a "duty ... deemed to be for the best interests of...
[the] child," where the parent or other person in custody has been
67 People v. Phipps, supra note 64; In re DiMaggio, 65 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Child.
Ct. 1946) ; In re Whitmore, supra note 64; Zambrotto v. Jannette, 160 Misc.
558, 290 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Child. Ct. 1936).
68 O'Rourke v. Reeve, 93 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Child. Ct. 1949) ; In re O'Donnell,
61 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Child. Ct. 1946); People v. Denny, 50 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Child.
Ct. 1944).
69 People v. Jones, supra note 66.
70 See N.Y. CHILDV N's CT. AcT § 15; see N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 721.
71 See N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1020.
72 N.Y.C. Dos. REL. CT. AcT § 72.
73 Ibid.
74 N.Y. CHILDeEN'S CT. Acr § 11.
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found to have contributed to neglect or delinquency. 5 Another pro-
vision of that act empowers the court to order parental conduct when
it has made a finding of neglect as to the child.70 While the "con-
tributing offense" provision of the "Upstate Act" makes no direct
mention of orders governing adult conduct,77 the act does make ref-
erence to support orders 78 and to "orders of protection" in connection
therewith. 79 Also, the act contains the general provision that in the
exercise of its jurisdiction the court shall have power "to make any
order necessary to carry out and enforce the provisions of this act." a0
The "violations" provisions of both acts give to the courts power to
punish as a contempt any violation of their competent orders.8 ' The
contempt procedure of the judiciary Law is incorporated in the acts.8 2
The New York State Temporary Commission on Youth and
Delinquency recently proposed that both acts be amended.83 The pur-
pose of the amendment was to make more effective the courts' power
to impose and enforce parental conduct helpful in correcting or pro-
tecting a delinquent or neglected child. It proposed that the courts be
obliged to summon the custodian of any child whose delinquency or
neglect is in issue. Upon adjudication of delinquency or neglect, all
children's courts would be clearly empowered to order parental con-
duct. The orders would be required to be in writing and to specify
conduct "such as would reasonably prevent delinquency or neglect."
A person charged with contempt for wilfully violating an order would
have notice of the accusation and a reasonable time to prepare a de-
fense. Fair and objective examination of the reasonableness and
specificity of the order, and of the evidence offered to support the
accusation, would be assured by providing that the contempt proceed-
ing be had before a judge other than the one who made the order.
The maximum punishment for a violation would be a fine of $250
and/or thirty days imprisonment in the county jail. The proposal has
been passed by the Legislature and sent to the Governor.84
Conclusion
It may be hoped that enactment of this amendment will clarify
the contempt jurisdiction of the children's courts and facilitate its
75 N.Y.C. DoM. REL. CT. AcT § 61(2).76 Id. § 61(8).
7 N.Y. CHILDREN's CT. AcT § 6(4).
78Id. §§6(2)(b), 30-a(1).79 Id. § 30-a (6).
80 Id. § 30-a(23).
81 N.Y.C. DoM. RE. CT. AcT §61(4); N.Y. Caiu.REN's CT. AcT § 6( 2)(c).
82 N.Y.C. Dom. RE. CT. Acr § 61(5); N.Y. CILDREN'S CT. AcT §§ 6(6) and
30-a (20).
83 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON YOUTH
AND DELINQUENcY 38 (December 1955).
84 A. No. 4666, Int. 3673 (March 23, 1956).
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exercise. Proper exercise of this jurisdiction should cause the pun-
ishment of parents to be seen in true perspective, as a necessary sanc-
tion to the courts' control of parental conduct respecting delinquent
and neglected children. The clarity and fairness of such an enactment
should help to remove from the children's courts the stigma which
attaches to agencies for criminal prosecution. The judges, being more
mindful of the efficacy and equity of the order enforcible through con-
tempt, will, it is hoped, insist upon transferring all misdemeanor
prosecutions to the competent criminal courts. Thus the criminal
jurisdiction exercised under the "contributing offense" provisions of
the children's court acts will be abandoned, effecting a de facto repeal
of the troublesome statutory provisions. Meanwhile, the legislature
should consider how best to revise the "contributing offense" clauses
which have been used to impose upon a civil tribunal the incubus of
an opprobrious and unwanted criminal jurisdiction.
X
IN REhI TAX FORECLOSURE-ITs DEFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES
A discussion of the evolution of the present New York law on
property tax enforcement illustrates a pendulous swing from a situ-
ation where the city was handicapped in protecting its tax assessment
interests, to one where a property owner is at a great disadvantage in
protecting his fundamental property rights. Where formerly the law
afforded adequate notice and substantial rights to the surplus of the
foreclosure sale and to redemption after judgment, under present
circumstances the law permits a foreclosure of all rights upon in-
adequate notice. The latter extreme requires modification.
Lien-sale Method of Tax Foreclosure
Until 1948, New York City employed the lien-sale method of
real property tax enforcement. Controlled by the city's Administrative
Code,' this method empowers the city to make collection by selling its
tax liens on delinquent property to private individuals for the full
amount of the arrears,2 including interest and penalties. 3 If no bids
are received, the tax collector may purchase the lien on behalf of the
city.4 Transfer of the tax lien to the successful bidder operates as an
IN.Y.C. AvmIN. CODE §§ 415(1)-23.0 to 415(1)-53.3.
2 Id. §415(1)-23.0.
3 Id. § 415 (1) -31.0. Such a sale is made by the city collector or any deputy.
Id. § 415(1)-27.0.41d. §415(1)-29.0.
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